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Abstract—In this paper we apply a passive testing methodology
to the analysis of a non-trivial system. In our framework, so-
called invariants provide us with a formal representation of the
requirements of the system. In order to precisely express new
properties in multi-node environments, in this paper we introduce
a new kind of invariants. We apply the resulting framework to
perform a complete study of a MANET routing protocol: The
Optimized Link State Routing protocol.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The complexity of current software systems requires the
application of sound Software Engineering techniques. Among
them, testing [1], [2] is the most widely used in industrial
environments. Traditionally, formal methods and testing have
been seen as rivals. Thus, there was very little interaction
between the two communities. In recent years, however, testing
and formal methods are learning from each other and are
currently seen as complementary fields [3], [4], [5], [6].
Usually, testing is based on the ability of a tester that
stimulates the implementation under test (IUT) and checks
the correction of the answers provided by the IUT. However,
sometimes this activity becomes difficult and even impossible
to perform. For example, this is the case if the tester is not
provided with an interface to interact with the IUT or if the
implementation is built from components that are running and
cannot be shutdown or interrupted for a long period of time.
In these situations, there is a particular interest in using other
types of validation techniques such as passive testing. Passive
testing consists in analyzing the traces recorded from the IUT
and trying to find a fault by comparing these traces with either
the complete specification or with some specific requirements
(see, for example, [7], [8], [9], [10], [11]). A new methodology
to perform passive testing was presented in [12], [13], [14].
The main novelty is that a set of invariants is used to represent
the most relevant properties of a system. An invariant can be
seen as a restriction over the traces allowed to the IUT.
Even though there are several proposal to perform active
testing of timed systems (see, for example, [15], [16], [17],
[18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24]), work on formal passive
testing of timed systems did not attract much attention until
recently. Taking as initial step [14], the approach presented
in [25], [26] included the possibility of adding time constraints
as properties that traces extracted from the IUT must hold.
Even though this framework was very appropriate to analyze a
large variety of timed systems, we observed that our invariants
become large and complicated when there is a big number of
nodes in the environment. In this paper we present a new
temporal framework that takes as starting point our previous
work. We consider a new type of invariants that are useful to
analyze properties that appear in the type of systems that we
are interested in. The new class of invariants, called continuous
timed invariants, allows us to include a “message filter”
behavior to abstract those packages that are not used during
the testing phase. After performing different experiments on
systems running over networks with a big number of nodes,
we consider that the addition of continuous timed invariants
to our former framework eases the task of defining relevant
properties.
In addition to the theoretical framework, we have extended
the tool PASTE (PASsive TEsting) to include the new class of
invariants. In this paper we show how the off-line monitoring
module of the tool is used to study the applicability of our
formal techniques to the analysis of the OLSR MANET routing
protocol (Optimized Link State Routing protocol). We will
present a set of relevant invariants, denoting the requirements
to be checked, and we will report the results of the experiments
and discuss them.
It is worth to point out that our passive testing approach is
somehow related to runtime verification [27] since they share
similar objectives and procedures. Runtime verification tech-
niques are used to dynamically verify the behavior observed
in the target system with respect to some requirements. These
requirements are often formally specified and verification
techniques are used both to check that the observed behavior
matches the specified properties and to explicitly recognize
undesirable behaviors in the target system. The main difference
between runtime verification and (formal) passive testing is
given by the theoretical tools underlying the application of the
techniques. In the case of runtime verification, casual relations
among actions and temporal constraints on their performance
are defined by using a certain temporal logic. Such languages
2009 16th Asia-Pacific Software Engineering Conference
1530-1362/09 $26.00 © 2009 IEEE
DOI 10.1109/APSEC.2009.37
152
are, in general, more expressive than our notions of invariant.
The main problem with such expressive languages is that it is
far from easy for a (passive or active) tester, used to define
relations between applied inputs and observed outputs, to write
properties to be checked against the IUT as a temporal logic
formula. On the contrary, the syntax of invariants is very
similar to the usual sequences of inputs and outputs used in
model-based testing. Also related to this issue, if we have
an invariant expressing an interesting property of the system
and we are granted with access to the system, so that we can
become an active testing, it is straightforward to transform the
invariant into test cases; this transformation is not so simple
if we are dealing with temporal logic formulae.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II
we present our formal framework. In Section III, containing
the bulk of the paper, we present the Optimized Link State
Routing protocol (OLSR), we give a set of representative
timed invariants, and we perform some experiments on real
traces. We conclude with Section IV where we present the
conclusions and some lines of future work.
II. DEFINITION OF TIMED INVARIANTS
First we introduce some auxiliary notation. In this paper
we are only interested in the messages that are recorded from
the environment. These messages are generated for different
purposes (mainly control and exchange). We will focus on the
different tags and values that can be found inside them. For
example, in a wireless network, a package usually contains
some neighbors address, link status and types, which raise
several interesting constraints.
Definition 1: A tag is any string of characters. The set
of all tags is denoted by TAG. A message is a tuple 푚 =
(푖, 푓,푁,풩 ,ℑ) where 푖 ∈ TAG denotes the kind of message.
We assume that this string begins with either ? or !. 푓 ∈ IN
denotes the source of the message, 푁 ⊆ IN is the set of
neighbors of this message, 풩 ⊆ TAG is the set of possible
links that this message can hold, we force that no element of
풩 starts with either ? or !. Finally, ℑ : 풩 7→ ℘(IN) is a
function that associates each link belonging to 풩 to the set of
neighbors that share this link.
The set of all messages is denoted byℳ. We will define the
function 횤 :ℳ 7→ TAG such that for each 푚 = (푖, 푓,푁,풩 ,ℑ)
we have 횤(푚) = 푖.
Given two messages 푚1 = (푖1, 푓1, 푁1,풩1,ℑ1) and 푚2 =
(푖2, 푓2, 푁2,풩2,ℑ2), we say that 푚1 matches 푚2, denoted by
m(푚1,푚2), iff 푖1 = 푖2, 푓1 = 푓2, 푁1 ⊆ 푁2 and for all 푡 ∈ 풩1,
there exists 푡′ ∈ 풩2 such that ℑ1(푡) ⊆ ℑ2(푡′).
We will denote by 휃 the wild-message. This message has
the following two properties: 휃 ∕∈ ℳ and for all 푚 ∈ ℳ we
have that m(휃,푚)=true. ⊓⊔
We say that a message starting with ? is an input message
while messages starting with ! are called output messages.
Along this paper, we will “spread” any tuple-message to a
char string in order to make it easier to read. For example,
if we have the message (!hello, n0, ∅, {AsymLink},ℑ),
where ℑ(AsymLink)={n1} we will write the following char
string: !Hello_FROM_n0_AsymLink_n1. Let us remark
that a message has associated several spread strings. So, if
there could be any confusion then we would write the complete
tuple.
Passive testing makes use of the exchanged messages in
order to detect faults. Logs extracted from IUTs do not only
represent the value of the messages, but also include time
information that denotes the amount of time elapsed between
consecutive messages.
Definition 2: We say that a log of a system is a finite
sequence belonging to (ℳ ⋅ IR+)★ ⋅ ℳ. The set of logs is
denoted by ℒ. Let 휎 and 휎′ be two logs. We write 휎 < 휎′ if
휎 is contained in 휎′.
The function TT : ℒ 7→ IR+ is defined, for each 휎 =
⟨푚1, 푡1, . . . , 푡푛−1,푚푛⟩ ∈ ℒ, as TT(휎) =
∑푛−1
푖=1 푡푖. ⊓⊔
Before introducing timed invariants, we give notation re-
garding the definition of time intervals. Since these intervals
will represent time, we consider that the lower bound cannot
be negative.
Definition 3: We say that 푝ˆ = [푝1, 푝2] is a time interval if
푝1 ∈ IR+, 푝2 ∈ IR+ ∪ {∞}, and 푝1 ≤ 푝2. We assume that for
all 푡 ∈ IR+ we have 푡 <∞ and 푡+∞ =∞. We consider that
ℐℛ denotes the set of time intervals. Let us note that in the
case of [푡,∞) we are abusing the notation since this interval
represents, in fact, the interval [푡,∞].
We consider the following functions:
∙ + : ℐℛ × ℐℛ → ℐℛ. If 푝ˆ = [푝1, 푝2] and 푞ˆ = [푞1, 푞2] are
time intervals then 푝ˆ+ 푞ˆ = [푝1 + 푞1, 푝2 + 푞2].
∙ ⊙ : ℐℛ × IR+ → {푡푟푢푒, 푓푎푙푠푒}. If 푝ˆ = [푝1, 푝2] is a time
interval and 푡 ∈ IR+ then 푝ˆ⊙ 푡 = (푡 ≤ 푝2).
We say that the sequence 휓 is a timed invariant if 휓 is
defined according to the following EBNF:
휓 ::= 푚/푝ˆ, 휓 ∣ ★ /푝ˆ, 휓′ ∣푚′ ⊳푝ˆ 퐴, 푞ˆ
휓′ ::= 푚′/푝ˆ, 휓 ∣푚′ ⊳푝ˆ 퐴, 푞ˆ
In this expression we consider 푝ˆ, 푞ˆ ∈ ℐℛ, 푚′ ∈ ℳ, 푚 ∈
ℳ∪ {휃}, and 퐴 ⊆ℳ. ⊓⊔
Timed invariants are used to represent a set of functional
and non-functional requirements which we will use to check
the correctness of the logs. Intuitively, the previous EBNF
expresses that an invariant is a sequence of symbols where
each component, excluding the last one, is either:
∙ A pair 푚/푝ˆ, with 푚 being a message in ℳ or the wild-
message 휃, and 푝ˆ being a time interval,
∙ or an expression ★/푝ˆ.
There are two restrictions to this ★-rule. First, an invariant
cannot contain two consecutive ★’s as ★/푝ˆ1 and ★/푝ˆ2 since
this is the same as having ★/(푝ˆ1+ 푝ˆ2). The second restriction
is that an invariant cannot present a pair ★/푝ˆ followed by 휃,
that is, the message of the next component must be a real
message belonging to ℳ. In fact, given an invariant such as
휓 = . . . , ★/푝ˆ1,푚
′/푝ˆ2, . . . we have ★/푝ˆ1 represents a sequence
of pairs message/time ⟨푚1/푡1, . . . ,푚푛/푡푛⟩ ∈ (ℳ× IR+)푛,
with
∑푛
푗=1 푡푗 ∈ 푝ˆ1, and for all 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푛 we have 횤(푚′) ∕=
횤(푚푖).
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Finally, the last component of an invariant corresponding to
the expression 푚′ ⊳푝ˆ 퐴, 푞ˆ, that is, a message associated with
a time interval followed by a set of messages and another time
interval. This last interval is used to control the sum of time
values associated to all the actions performed during matching
the invariant. For a more precise and formal explanation of
timed invariants, the interested reader is referred to [25].
Next, we will provide the notion of correctness of a log
with respect to a time invariant. In order to define it, we have
first to introduce the notion of matching a log with respect to
an invariant.
Definition 4: Let 휎 = ⟨푚1, 푡1, . . . ,푚푟⟩ be a log and 휓 =
휉1/푝ˆ1, . . . , 휉푛/푝ˆ푛,푚푓 ⊳푞ˆ푓 퐴, 푝ˆ푓 be a timed invariant. We say
that 휎 matches 휓 if after applying Algorithm 1 we have that
푛 = 푗 (the loop has visited the first 푛 positions of the invariant)
and 푥 < 푟 (the trace contains at least one element so that
its head can be compared with the last part of the invariant:
푚푓 ⊳푞ˆ푓 퐴, 푝ˆ푓 ). ⊓⊔
For example, an invariant such as
푚/푝ˆ, ★/푝ˆ★,푚푓 ⊳푝ˆ′ 퐴, 푞ˆ
indicates that if we match a message of the trace with the
message 푚, and it is followed by a time value belonging
to the interval 푝ˆ, and if we have any sequence of pairs
message/time not matching the message 푚푓 and the sum of
time values belongs to 푝ˆ★, and if this sequence is followed
by a message 푚′′ matching 푚푓 then we should have a lapse
of time belonging to the interval 푝ˆ′ and we will observe a
message 푚푎 that matches an existing message belonging to
퐴. Finally, the performance of the complete sequence, from
푚 to 푚푎, must belong to the interval 푞ˆ.
Definition 5: Let 휓 = 휉1/푝ˆ1, . . . , 휉푛/푝ˆ푛,푚푓 ⊳푝ˆ푓 퐴, 푞ˆ푓 be
a timed invariant and 휎 be a log. We say that 휎 is correct with
respect to 휓, iff either 휎 does not match 휓 (see Definition 4)
or 휎 matches 휓 and m(푚푓 ,푚푥) implies
∃푚 ∈ 퐴 : m(푚,푚푥+1) ∧ 푡푥 ∈ 푝ˆ푓∧
TT(푚푥′ , 푡푥′ , . . . , 푡푥,푚푥+1) ∈ 푞ˆ푓
where the variables 푥 and 푥′ contain the values returned by
Algorithm 1. ⊓⊔
In this paper we present another kind of invariants called
continuous timed invariants. This new family allows us to
express properties in networking environments where the
number of nodes is greater than two. The idea is to provide an
easy representation that allows to filter the messages that we
do not need to check, making them non-observable ones. As in
the previous definition, first we present the grammar to build
the new invariants and next we present the formal correctness
of logs with respect to them.
Definition 6: We say that the sequence 휓 is a continuous
timed invariant if 휓 is defined according to the following
EBNF:
휓 ::= 푚/푝ˆ, 휓 ∣ ★ /푝ˆ, 휓′ ∣푚′ ⊳⊳푝ˆ 퐴, 푞ˆ
휓′ ::= 푚′/푝ˆ, 휓 ∣푚′ ⊳⊳푝ˆ 퐴, 푞ˆ,
In this expression we consider 푝ˆ, 푞ˆ ∈ ℐℛ, 푚′ ∈ ℳ, 푚 ∈
ℳ∪ {휃}, and 퐴 ⊆ℳ. ⊓⊔
in : 휓 = 휉1/푝ˆ1, . . . , 휉푛/푝ˆ푛, 훼푓op푞ˆ푓퐴, 푝ˆ푓
// either 휉푘 = 푚 ∈ℳ or 휉푘 = 휃, or 휉푘 = ★,
// and op ∈ {⊳,⊳⊳}
휎 = ⟨푚1, 푡1, . . . , 푡푟−1,푚푟⟩
out: 푥, 푥′ ∈ IN
푥 = 1;
// is the current position of the trace
푥′ = 1;
// is the base-position of the trace
푗 = 1;
// is the current position of the invariant to match
while 푗 ≤ 푛 ∧ (푥′ + 푛+ 1) < 푟 ∧ 푥 < 푟 do
if 푗 == 1 then
푥′ = 푥′ + 1
end
(푚푒, 푡푒) = 휎[푥]//푥-th element of 휎;
switch 휉푗 do
case 푚
if m(푚푗 ,푚푒) ∧ 푡푒 ∈ 푝ˆ푗 then
푥 = 푥+ 1;
푗 = 푗 + 1;
else
푗 = 1;
푥 = 푥′;
end
end
case 휃
if 푡푒 ∈ 푝ˆ푗 then
푥 = 푥+ 1;
푗 = 푗 + 1;
else
푗 = 1;
푥 = 푥′;
end
end
case ★
푥′′ = 푥; 푡′′ = 0;
푚′ = 휉푗+1;
while ¬m(푚′,푚푒) ∧ 푝ˆ푗 ⊙ 푡′′ ∧ 푥′′ < 푟 do
푥′′ = 푥′′ + 1;
푡′′ = 푡′′ + 푡푒;
(푚푒, 푡푒) = 휎[푥
′′];
end
if 푡′′ ∈ 푝ˆ푗 then
푥 = 푥′′;
푗 = 푗 + 1;
else
푗 = 1;
푥 = 푥′;
end
end
end
end
Algorithm 1: Matching 휎 and 휓.
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Next we describe the differences between the two classes
of invariants. Let us consider 휓1 = 푚푓 ⊳푝ˆ 퐴, 푞ˆ and 휓2 =
푚푓 ⊳⊳푝ˆ 퐴, 푞ˆ. The meaning of 휓1 is that if we see in the
trace a message that matches 푚푓 then it will be followed by
an amount of time in 푝ˆ and with a message matching one of
the elements in 퐴. The meaning of 휓2 is that if we observe
the message 푚푓 then we will observe any sequence of pairs
message-time before having a message that matches a message
in 퐴. The amount of time that this allowed sequence can spend
has to belong to 푝ˆ. Regarding this new notion, let us comment
that although sometimes it might seem that a timed invariant
and a continuous timed invariant reflect the same property,
there always exist some differences.
Example 1: Let us consider the following two timed invari-
ants
휓1 = 푚
′ ⊳[0,0] {푚1,푚2}, [0, 2]
휓2 = 푚
′ ⊳⊳[0,0] {푚1,푚2}, [0, 2]
and let 휎 = ⟨훼, 4,푚′, 0,푚′3, 0,푚2⟩ be a log. We have that 휎
is correct with respect to 휓2 but it is not with respect to 휓1.
Let us remark that continuous timed invariants always accept
more logs than its corresponding timed invariant where we
replace the symbol ⊳⊳ by the symbol ⊳. ⊓⊔
Next, we will define the formal correctness criterion for
continuous timed invariants. Similar to the previous formal
correctness definition, we will make use of Definition 4.
Definition 7: Let 휓 = 휉1/푝ˆ1, . . . , 휉푛/푝ˆ푛,푚푓 ⊳⊳푝ˆ푓 퐴, 푞ˆ푓
be a continuous timed invariant and 휎 be a log. We say that 휎
is correct with respect to 휓, iff either 휎 does not match 휓 (see
Definition 4 since the notion of matching is exactly the same
if we replace ⊳ by ⊳⊳) or 휎 matches 휓 and m(푚푓 ,푚푒,)
implies
∃휎′ = ⟨푚푒, 푡푒, . . . ,푚푛, 푡푛,푚푛+1⟩ : 휎′ < 휎∧
∀푚′ ∈ {푚푒, . . . ,푚푛}, ∕ ∃푚′′ ∈ 퐴 :
(횤(푚′) ∕= 횤(푚′′) ∧m(푚′′,푚푛+1))∧
TT(푚푒, 푡푒, . . . , 푡푛,푚푛+1) ∈ 푝ˆ푓∧
TT(푚푥′ , 푡푥′ , . . . , 푡푛,푚푛+1) ∈ 푞ˆ푓
where (푚푒, 푡푒) = 휎[푥], having the variables 푥 and 푥′ the
values returned by Algorithm 1. ⊓⊔
III. A REAL CASE STUDY: THE OLSR PROTOCOL
In this section we will apply our timed passive testing
methodology to a non-trivial case study. First, we will present
the OLSR protocol. We will focus on some stages of it and
we will propose a set of timed invariants to check them.
At the end of this section, we will present our tool PASTE,
which implements the formal timed framework presented in
the previous section and we will discuss the results of applying
the set of proposed invariants to traces extracted from systems
running this protocol.
A. The Protocol
The OLSR protocol, standardized by the IETF, is a link-
state proactive protocol dedicated to the routing in the
MANET [28]. OLSR manages to diffuse routing information
through an efficient flooding technique. The key innovation of
this protocol is the concept of Multi-Point Relays (MPRs). A
node’s multi-point relay is a subset of its neighbors whose
combined radio range covers all nodes two hops away. In
order for a node to determine its minimum multipoint relay
set based on its two-hop topology, periodic broadcasts are
required. Similar to conventional link-state protocols, the link
information updates are propagated throughout the network.
However in OLSR, when a node has to forward a link update
it only forwards it to its MPR set of nodes. Finally, the
distribution of topological information is realized with the
use of periodic topology control messages and as a result,
each node has a partial graph of the topology of the network
that is used to calculate the optimal routes. OLSR is mostly
preferred when the ad hoc network consists of a large number
of nodes and has a high density. One of the main advantages
of the OLSR protocol is that it does not make any assumption
concerning the underlying link layer, allowing it to be used in
a variety of configurations.
Three main functionalities are studied in this paper: The link
sensing, the neighbor detection and the dissemination of link
state information. The two first are obtained by broadcasting
and analyzing Hello() messages in order to discover 2-hop
neighbor information and to perform a distributed selection of
MPR sets. The third one is taken in charge by the Topology
Control (TC) messages sent in particular by the MPR nodes.
B. The Real Wireless Testbed
Our testbed is composed of four laptops as illustrated in
Figure 1. It must be noted that we could increase the number
of nodes by using an emulation technique embedded in one
of the laptops (see [29] for more details). This technique is
nevertheless useless regarding our current test purposes since
four nodes is the number of nodes necessary to check the
properties we are interested in. Three laptops embed an Intel
Pro Wireless 802.11 a/b/g Wifi card (two of them with Fedora
Core 8 and one with a Suse Linux 9.3). The fourth one
embeds a WPN111 Wireless USB adapter on a Fedora Core
8. All the nodes were configured in ad hoc mode and run an
OLSR implementation version olsrd-0.5.6-rc1. The protocol is
configured to run in the wireless interfaces of the nodes and
with the link quality measurements option deactivated in order
to comply with the RFC.
The trace is captured using the Wireshark Network Ana-
lyzer http://www.wireshark.org/ installed in Node 0
and launched at the beginning of all packet transmissions to
ensure that the start state is captured in the trace.
The provided trace contains all the packet information
extracted from the network including information from the
different protocol layers (Ethernet, IP, UDP and OLSR). The
OLSR layer provides the information that we need (source,
destination, message type, link type and list of neighbors).
The Wireshark process sniffing the OLSR protocol was run
during 9 minutes and 29 secondes allowing to provide exactly
1350 actions in that trace. The trace has been transformed in
plain text format by that same tool allowing the use of PASTE
(described below).
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Figure 1. The wireless testbed.
10.0.0.1 BROADCAST
Hello()
Hello()
Total time 2 seconds
Figure 2. OLSR diagram for 휑1.
C. The Invariants
The invariants presented in this section describe the process
of connectivity by ensuring that a node n0 will respect the
procedure followed by the protocol to establish the links
with its neighbors. This procedure also ensures that a node
n0 cannot be fooled by another node n1 by announcing a
nonexistent connection.
Let us remark that it is important that for every invariant, the
number of messages to be checked is always bounded. This
number directly depends on the number of neighbors for each
node, which is supposed to be fixed (at a particular moment).
So the number of addresses embedded within each message
is limited. Moreover, the broadcast of control packets are
temporized by constants. Hello() messages can be emitted
as long as a link change is detected, but nodes need to wait
for a timeout (2 seconds by default) to announce the change.
Thus, even though the mobility of nodes is normally very high,
the number of messages exchanged during the life of a link is
finite.
Next we present a set of relevant invariants for the OLSR
protocol. Besides, in order to match the sniffed trace, we have
that the variables n0 and n1 correspond to the nodes whose
IP address are respectively 10.0.0.1 and 10.0.0.10. Let us
comment than in the formal definition of messages, the source
of the tuple is a natural number instead of IP numbers, but
there do not exists any problem to transform IPs into naturals.
We briefly comment the main behavior that each invariant
represents.
휑1 =!Hello_FROM_n0 ⊳[2,2]!Hello_FROM_n0, [2, 2]
The invariant 휑1 represents that always if an isolated OLSR
node has to emit the Hello() message, then it has to repeat
the same message with a frequency of two seconds. This idea
is graphically expressed in Figure 2.
휑2 = !Hello_FROM_n0_SymLink_n1/[0, 2], ★/[0, 2],
?Hello_FROM_n1_SymLink_n0 ⊳⊳[0,4]
{!Hello_FROM_n0_MPRLink_n1,
?Hello_FROM_n1_MPRLink_n0}, [0,∞]
The invariant 휑2 expresses that if a node n0 has associated a
symmetric link with the node n1 and if we observe that n1
has declared a symmetric link with the node n0, then it is
expected to observe either an MPR link connection from n1
adding in its neighbor list n0 or viceversa. In Figure 3, up,
we have a graphical representation of both diagrams.
휑3 = ?Hello_FROM_n1/[0, 2], ★/[0, 2],
Hello_FROM_n0_AsymLink_n1 ⊳⊳[0,2]
{?Hello_FROM_n1_SymLink_n0}, [0, 4]
The invariant 휑3 represents that if we observe in the trace a
Hello() message from n1 and if n0 sends a Hello()
mentioning an asymmetric link with n1, then n0 will be
declared into the neighbor list of the symmetric link in n1
and the elapsed time associated with all these messages, that
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10.0.0.1 10.0.0.10
Hello(SymWith_n1)
Hello(SymWith_n0)
Hello(MPR_n1)
Hello(MPR_n0)
Diagram A
10.0.0.1 10.0.0.10
Hello(SymWith_n1)
Hello(SymWith_n0)
Hello(MPR_n1)
Hello(MPR_n1)
Diagram B
10.0.0.1 10.0.0.10
Hello()
Hello(AsymWith_n1)
Hello(SymWith_n0)
Total time 4 seconds
10.0.0.1 10.0.0.10
Hello(AsymWith_n1)
Hello(SymWith_n0)
Hello(SymWith_n1)
Total time 4 seconds
10.0.0.1 10.0.0.10
Hello(MPR_n0)
TC()
Total time 5 seconds
Figure 3. OLSR diagram for 휑2, 휑3, 휑4 and 휑5.
is, from the first Hello() from n1 until receiving the confir-
mation Hello() from n1, must belong to [0,4]. In Figure 3,
below left corner, we have the graphical representation of this
invariant.
휑4 = !Hello_FROM_n0_AsymLink_n1/[0, 2],
★/[0, 2], ?Hello_FROM_n1_SymLink_n0
⊳⊳[0,2] {!Hello_FROM_n0_SymLink_n1}, [0, 4]
The invariant 휑4 concerns symmetric and asymmetric links.
This invariant represents that if the node n0 has associated an
asymmetric link with n1 and if there exists a petition from
n1 to make this link as symmetric, then n0 will answer this
request by adding n1 in its list of neighbors of symmetric
link. Figure 3, below center, shows the graphical representation
of 휑4.
휑5 = ?Hello_FROM_n1_MPRLink_n0 ⊳⊳[0,5]
{!TC_FROM_n0}, [0, 5]
Concerning the typology control messages, the invariant 휑5
reflects that if a node n1 has into its neighbor MPR link
list a node n0 and n1 broadcasts this information inside of
a Hello() message, then we must observe a TC message
from n0 in a time less than or equal to 5 seconds. In Figure 3,
10.0.0.1 BROADCAST
TC()
TC()
Total time 5 seconds
Figure 4. OLSR diagram for 휑6.
below right, we give the graphical representation of 휑5.
휑6 = !TC_FROM_n0 ⊳⊳[0,5] {!TC_FROM_n0}, [0, 5]
This last invariant represents that always if a node n0 (ac-
cording with 휑5 is in the neighbor MPR list of another node)
starts sending a TC message, then it will send this information
with an associated frequency less than or equal to 5 seconds.
Figure 4 shows the graphical representation of 휑6.
D. Experimental Results using PASTE
We have extended our PASTE tool (some experiments
with this tool are reported in [30]) with the new kind
of invariants. The original core was implemented in JAVA
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and it was an isolated project. Later, it was decided to
include our academic tool as a module of a more impor-
tant monitoring tool, developed by the SME Peopleware,
called OSMIUS (see http://www.osmius.net). This is
a monitoring tool released under the GPLv2 license and
available in the open source repository Sourceforge. Osmius
is designed to be extensible in such a way that it can
be used to monitor any device or software connected to a
network. Therefore, the new version includes the complete
migration of the code from JAVA to C++ (more information
in http://kimba.mat.ucm.es/paste/).
Next we report the results, using PASTE, over the recorded
logs containing 1350 tokens. The results are presented in Fig-
ure 5. In these tables, the first column lists the set of invariants.
The other columns represent different freedom degrees over
the timed constrains (for example, at 휑1, which has associated
the time interval [2,2], the column ±0.4 represents the results
obtained by changing the time constrains to [1.6, 2.4]). Each
cell contains two values. The first one corresponds to the
number of time values belonging to the considered intervals
while the second value corresponds to the number of values
that do not belong to the interval and therefore represent a
(performance) fault.
As we had already mentioned, the invariant 휑1 is only useful
when there are two nodes interacting between themselves. In
the studied trace there are four nodes. So, we have to adapt
휑1 with:
휑1푎 =!Hello_FROM_n0 ⊳⊳[2,2]!Hello_FROM_n0, [2, 2]
Concerning the results for 휑1 and 휑1푎, we did not observe
a message that arrived “just in time”, that is, in 2 seconds.
When we allow some freedom degree, the number of values
belonging to the interval increases. Let us also note that the
invariant 휑1 returns 262 faults. However, these values are false
positive because there are more than two nodes in the network;
when we check its modification, 휑1푎, we observe that there
are not so many faults. Let us remark that the number of faults
decreases as the time interval increases. This makes us suspect
that we did not find functional errors, as expected, but some
deviations in performance. In fact, if we check the time values
when we increase the time interval in ten seconds for 휑1푎, then
all the values belong to the interval and we can claim that we
did not find functional errors. In Figure 5 (top), we also report
the results for 휑6. We group them together because they are
studied by using the same scale of freedom degree.
In Figure 5, middle, we give the results for 휑2. The scale of
the freedom degree has changed. In fact, they are several times
the ones applied to 휑1, 휑1푎, and 휑6. The reason for this is
that this invariant should only denote functional properties.
Therefore, we should consider that all intervals are set to
[0,∞] (last column).
In Figure 5, bottom, we present the results for the invariants
휑3, 휑4, and 휑5. These are the invariants that are checked less
times. Almost all of them are checked correctly with their
initial time constrains. We only needed to add a small freedom
degree to 휑5 in order to obtain the full set of correct cases.
±0 ±0.2 ±0.4 ±1 ±10
휑1 0/266 4/262 4/262 4/262 4/262
휑1푎 0/266 204/62 217/49 245/25 266/0
휑6 38/68 56/50 71/35 90/16 106/0
±0 ±3 ±10 ±40 ±∞
휑2 표4/160 7/157 11/153 38/126 164/0
±0 ±2
휑3 4/0 4/0
휑4 4/0 4/0
휑5 6/1 7/0
Figure 5. Results after the application of invariants.
Finally, we discuss the most relevant features of this analy-
sis. First, let us remark that the full set of proposed invariants
are matched at least one time over a normal trace. The in-
variants that are checked more times are 휑1 and 휑1푎. Another
conclusion is that when we are working with environments
containing more than two nodes, continuous timed invariants
are always better than timed ones to detect faults. The set
of invariants could be also classified with respect to the
number of times checked on the traces. The subset composed
by invariants 휑4, 휑5 and 휑6 can be considered as security
invariants. The reason is that in almost 100% checked times,
these invariants hold. The rest of invariants can be seen as
performance invariants. They check the real behavior (e.g.
delays, white noise of the net, etc) that the communication is
having. We can use them to detect communication bottlenecks.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have presented a case study of formal
passive testing in a network protocol. We have reviewed our
previous methodology and introduced a new notion of timed
invariant. We have also presented a complete study of a
MANET routing protocol: The Optimized Link State Routing
protocol. We have defined a set of representative invariants.
We have performed passive testing against real logs of this
protocol and we have reported and commented the results.
We hope that this study shows that any tester should be able
to define and check interesting properties about the typology
of the network, its global performance, security properties, etc.
As future work we plan to consider the study of other
systems and to extend the types of invariants by defining
appropriate timed extensions of obligation invariants [14].
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